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Abstract
The impact of structural funds of the European Union (EU) on regional economic growth
is a matter of both political and economic importance. The large and regular payments
made across the EU to countries and regions within them were and are meant to promote
various aspects of growth and development and to encourage structural changes that foster
investments and economic reforms. But how much of these aims have they been achieved? In
this paper we provide considerable empirical evidence that Greek regions have, for the most
part, benefited by the various disbursements of EU structural funds. We shed partial light
on where this funding went to and to how it potentially contributed to Greek growth but we
also raise a number of questions about the viability of the current productive structure of the
Greek economy and its over-reliance on tourism. Our results provide support on the efficacy
of the payments but leave open the problem of where these payments should be allocated, the
monitoring of their absorption and the end impact in the economic cycle within a country.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The EU structural fund case
Cohesion policy is the EUs main investment policy (Giurescu, 2019). This policy is addressed to all
regions and cities in the European Union. Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund are the most
important economic policy measures adopted by the European Commission to positively influence
the economic development of the states and support Europes poorest regions. The primary goal
of the EU through these funds is to harmonize the levels of the economic development between
states in order to reduce the existing gaps between developed and less developed regions (Hagen
& Mohl, 2016). These funds were created for the regions whose development is lagging behind in
order to reduce the differences and create a better economic and social balance within and between
member states. Their main objective is to transform and modernize the structure of the relatively
poor economies in order to prepare them for competition within the single market and the euro
zone. Together with the Common Agricultural Policy, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion
Fund are the largest part of the total EU financing and the bulk of total EU expenditure. For the
period 2014-2020, new objectives have been determined, with a total budget amounting to euro
351.8 billion at current prices (Giurescu, 2019). Cohesion policy objectives are achieved through
the following main funds (Mohl and Hagen, 2010):
• The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF): The ERDF concerns programs related
to regional development, economic change, improved competitiveness and cross-border co-
operation across Europe. The funding priorities refer to research, innovation, environmental
protection and risk prevention, while infrastructure investments retain an important role,
particularly in the less developed regions.
• The European Social Fund (ESF): The ESF focuses on four key areas: increasing adaptability
of workers and enterprises, improving access to employment and the labor market, reinforcing
social inclusion by combating discrimination and facilitating access to the labor market for
disadvantaged people, promoting cooperative spirit for reforms in the fields of employment
and inclusion.
• The Cohesion Fund (CF): The funding from the CF is addressed to member states with a
gross national income per capita below 90% of the Communitys average. The Cohesion Fund
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contributes to the interventions in the field of environment and trans-European transport
networks.
• The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD): The rural development
measures reinforce the market measures and income supports of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) with strategies and funding to strengthen the EU’s agri-food and forestry
sectors, environmental sustainability and the wellbeing of rural areas in general.
• The European Investment Fund (EIF) supports Europe’s small and medium-sized businesses
by enhancing their access to finance. EIF designs and develops venture capital and guarantees
instruments which specifically target this market segment.
• The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to ensure that fishing and aquaculture are envi-
ronmentally and socially sustainable and they provide a source of healthy food for the EU
citizens. Its goal is to foster a dynamic fishing industry and ensure a fair standard of living
for fishing communities.
Structural Funds, comprise, as we noted, the main instrument of the EU regional policy (Leonard,
1998) with the aim to promote economic and social cohesion, as well as balanced and sustainable
development of the European Union. They develop actions in the fields of infrastructure improve-
ment, education and training, environmental protection, diversification of activities in rural areas,
business modernization, industrial restructuring and in the development of new business activities
that create jobs. Structural Funds, as well as all regional policy forms prior to the current form
of the regional policy, operate under rules specified in the relevant regulations. These regulations
determine the eligibility of specific regions (the GDP per capita of which, in terms of purchas-
ing power parity, does not exceed 75% of the EUs average), the method of processing, approval,
monitoring and funding of projects (percentage of Community, state participation and private
participation), and the duration of these programs (Becker, Egger and Von Ehrlich, 2010). The
regions that receive aid of this type must be either lagging behind in terms of development or
regions in industrial decline or rural areas other than the two previous sets (Moussis, 2007).
The design and implementation of the Structural Operations takes place in cooperation of the
EU, the national and regional authorities, as specified by the broader partnership and subsidiarity
principles, after the Member States prepare the development plans which are submitted to the
Commission. Based on these plans, the Commission draws up the Community Support Framework
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(CSF) for the specific period. In this plan the actions of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion
Fund are coordinated. Then, the operational programs are prepared, some that refer to sectors
and apply to the entire country and others that have a regional character (Regional Operational
Programs). The programs are implemented and monitored by the provided committees with the
participation of representatives of the community, the national and regional bodies, and many times
for the more efficient management of these programs special bodies are created and dedicated for
that purpose such as the Management Organization Unit in the Second CSF, and the Managing
Authorities per operational program in the Third CSF (Mohl and Hagen, 2010).
1.2 Greece and its EU structural funding background
In this paper we closely examine the case of EU structural funding for Greece. Beyond being
a special case due to its highlighting role in the sovereign debt crisis a decade ago, Greece still
presents a thorny issue within the EU: on the one hand, Greece has a thriving tourism industry
but not much else of a competitive advantage - for a lot of regulations exist that do not allow the
growth of other productive forces such as higher education and scientific outsourcing; on the other
hand, Greece owes a tremendous amount of debt and for its repayment it needs growth, lots of it.
Thus, understanding whether Greece has benefited and how it has benefited from EU structural
funds is important, not only for the country itself but for the policies of the EU as a whole.
In the 1960s Greece was way behind the average European per capita income, but at least its
economy was growing faster and the gap was quickly reduced over time. However, in the 1970s the
speed of convergence slowed down and in the 1980s Greece was diverging from the other European
economies in terms of per capita income. Since 1981, Greece has received economic assistance
through the EU funds (European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund and structural
support for agriculture). It is only during the half of the 1990s that Greece has overtaken the
average growth pattern in the EU and thus the prosperity gap with the other European states
started shrinking again. This particular growth has been attributed to the CSF actions. Since
the late 1980s until today it is estimated that more than 80 billion of the EU contribution and
30 billion of the national contribution in six consecutive programs have supported the regional
development policies (mainly the policy of infrastructure development, business and investment
subsidies, human capital development and institutional reform) (Topaloglou et al. 2019).
EU structural funds were always important for improving the performance of the Greek econ-
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omy in terms of GDP, employment, productivity, investment and the trade balance. Since Greece
is in the middle of an unprecedented fiscal and economic crisis, EU structural funding is more
critical than ever. EU structural funds are an indispensable tool for boosting economic growth
without causing extra fiscal burden. Structural funds are channeled to Greece mainly through
the CSF of the EU and to a lesser extent through the Cohesion Fund, with the main purpose
of financing infrastructure projects. The Greek CSF is designed to finance large scale develop-
ment projects and investment in physical and human capital, aiming to gear the economy onto
a sustainable path of growth and prosperity. Up to date, there have been six programming pe-
riods for the structural funds, for the period (1989-2020). In the period between 1986 and 1993
the Mediterranean Integrated Programs (MIPs) pushed the available funds to small infrastructure
projects in Greece. Moreover, in 1994-1999 CSF, gave the incentives to the country to implement
the major infrastructure projects of national character. These infrastructures (railway network,
ports, highways) helped Greece not only to connect with other countries but also to be prepared
to enter the Economic Monetary Union. In the period 2000-2010, net transfers, from the EU to
Greece were on average 2.15% of GDP. These transfers include not only structural funds but also
agricultural subsidies. The largest part of these funds is channeled to public investment. Annual
expenditure funded by EU structural funds (EU contribution) averaged in Greece 1.22% of GDP
annually in the period 2000-2009. For 2007-2013, Greece has been allocated 20.4 billion euro in
total Cohesion Policy funding: 9.6 billion euro under the Convergence Objective, 635 million euro
under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective and 210 million euro under the
European Territorial Cooperation Objective (Andreou, 2010).
Structural policy can be studied in three phases: the budgetary envelope, programming and
policy implementation. In period 1989-1993 the stage of planning involved the compilation of
the Regional Development Plan (RDP), the establishment of the CSF and finally the creation of
Operational Programs (OPS). By the time that commission approved the OPS, the CFS became
operational. In that period, the First Greek CSF comprised 25 highly complex OPS and was
managed by the central government and administration. For the period 1994-1999, EU member
states drew up an RDP, which included specific economic programmes. After a negotiation of
the CFS with the Commission a Single Programming Document (SPD) was established. Thus,
member states brought detailed plans rather than general statements. During the second CSF
(1994-1999), financial support was doubled compared to the first CSF (1989-1993). There were 16
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sectoral OPS and 13 regional OPS (Andreou, 2010).
During the first and the second CSF, the implementation of the structural funds has been
described as causing turbulence to the Greek administrative system, an external shock and a treat
to the pre-existing institutional arrangements (Vamvakas, 2012). Most of the efforts aimed at the
increase of the absorption rates, ignoring the issue of implementation. The entry of Greece in the
European Union increased the resources of the country. In that time EU was not aware of the fact
that these extra resources were very difficult to exploit fully, as it demands time for the capacity
of the country to rise, in order to create business equivalent to the budget that it has available.
The effectiveness of European structural and cohesion funds has long been a contradictory topic,
both for European institutions and researches. This matter is particularly interesting for in-depth
exploration, because of the lack of unambiguous evidence regarding the effect of these funds on
beneficiary regions and countries. Greece has remained the main beneficiary of CSF since 1989,
however, data on GDP growth and labour market in the country is extremely contradictory.
In the rest of the paper we present our analysis on the impact of EU structural funding for
Greek regions. Greece has always been among the countries that have taken advantage of the
European funding channeling the economic help in the field of public investment in periods of
serious financial and of ongoing crisis. The existed European Union studies are occupied with the
impact of the structural funds and usually focus their research on specific programmes, evaluating
the short-term microeconomic impacts. On the other hand, the existed academic studies explore
the long-term macroeconomic impacts of structural funds on the economy of the recipient country.
However, in the end many are still unexplored related to the the political economic implications
of the European structural funds. Thus, our aim is not just to see the impact of various funding
packages on growth and investment but also to understand how this impact passes through to the
economy, whether it is just a push-up on private and government spending or whether it boosts
investment, how did it affect disposable income and also how did it interact with Greece’s staple
industry, tourism. In the next section we follow with a brief literature review on the concepts
of regional growth and related issues that pertain to our analysis. In section 3 we present our
data and empirical methodology. Section 4 contains our discussion of our results and their policy
implications. Section 5 offers our concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. All
tables are to be found in the Appendix.
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2 Brief Literature Review
Economic growth has been one of the most important economic issues in the literature since 1980s
and it is conditioned by many factors which act over time. The knowledge about which factors
account for economic growth, contribute to the form of efficient and sustainable economic policies.
A great number of empirical studies that focus on economic growth have been published in both
advanced and developing countries. However, the results of the studies have varied across the
countries due to the different levels of socio-economic development, the time of periods analyzed
and the research methods used.
The “growth” approach is particularly appropriate to study the impact of structural funds,
since these are designed to enhance the accumulation of production factors that affect the growth
rate of the recipient economies. Economists have spent decades debating, without resolution, the
cross-country relationship between foreign aid receipts and economic growth. Some find that aid
robustly causes positive economic growth on average, others cannot distinguish the average effect
from zero, while others find an effect only in certain countries. According to this last case structural
funds can be effective only under conditions, which usually are: the institutional condition of the
recipient country, the good policy environment, the climate-related circumstances, the level of
education of workforce and the level of government, the absorptive capacity and a set of controlled
variables. Moreover, the fungibility of aid,- which generally as a term describes a situation when
aid intended to finance public investment is diverted to government consumption- is a factor which
effects negatively the result of the aid given in the recipient country, Marc (2017).
Cerqua and Pellegrini (2018), suggest a positive effect of EU’s transfers on regional growth
by supporting that the estimated conditional intensity-growth function is concave and presents
a maximum value. They emphasise that the larger the per capita transfers are, the smaller the
regional growth rate. Therefore, these funds could have been allocated in other regions. Melecky
(2018), shares the above statement as according to his survey most countries with lower amount
of funding achieve higher efficiency, especially countries in a group of so called “old EU members”.
Pinho et al. (2015), in their research using a neoclassical growth model studying 12 EU countries
also find a positive effect of structural funds on growth but they claim that the impact is bigger
in richer, high educated and innovative regions.
A significant literature in econometrics is concerned with the ex post estimations of the casual
effects of transfers on investments and per capita income, since the development and growth of a
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country depends on them. Becker et.al. (2013), estimate the effects of the transfers by analysing
objective 1 transfers of the EU to regions below a certain income level. Only about 30% and 21%
of the regions -those with sufficient human capital and good enough institutions- are able to turn
transfers into faster per capita income growth and per capita investment respectively. Afonso and
Aubyn (2019), study the macroeconomic effects of public and private investment in 17 OECD
economies through a VAR analysis with annual data from 1960 to 2014. They find that public
investment has a positive growth effect in most countries, and a contractionary effect in Finland,
UK, Sweden, Japan, and Canada. Public investment led to private investment crowding out in
Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Canada, Sweden, the UK and crowding-in effects in the rest of the
countries. Private investment has a positive growth effect in all countries; crowds-out (crowds-in)
public investment in Belgium and Sweden (in the rest of the countries). The partial rates of return
of public and private investment are mostly positive.
The tourism sector is seen as a key factor for economic growth in many developed and emerg-
ing economies. Thus the argument is whether tourism can help countries to accomplish sustain-
able economic growth or vice versa. Eleftheriou and Sambrakos (2018), reconsider the tourism
growth nexus by accounting for spill-over effects between regional tourism development and re-
gional growth. Studying 49 NUTS 3 regions of Greece in the period 2010-2015, their findings
indicate strong short-run and long-run spillover effects, suggesting that policymakers should con-
sider regional tourism development as a key factor for boosting national economic growth. For
the US, Sharif et.al. (2017), use monthly data over the period 1996-2015 and show that there is a
significant long-run relationship that occurs between tourism development and economic growth.
Thus, it can be recommended that government needs to increase and promote tourism demand
and further providing and nurturing the expansion of tourism supply with the advancement of
economic growth. Antonakis et.al. (2015), based on monthly data for 10 European countries over
the period 1995-2012, find that the tourism-economic growth relationship is not stable over time in
terms of both magnitude and direction, indicating that the tourism led economic growth and the
economic driven tourism growth hypotheses are time dependent. This relationship is also highly
economic event dependent, as it is influenced by the Great Recession of 2007 and the ongoing
Eurozone debt crisis that began in 2010. Finally, the impact of these economic events is more
pronounced in Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain, which are the European countries that have
witnessed the greatest economic downturn since 2009. Risso (2018), using panel data, analyzed the
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relationship between tourism and economic growth for a worldwide dataset of 179 countries during
19952016. He finds that a 100% increase in number of arrivals, tourism receipts, and tourism ex-
penditure increases per capita GDP by 9%, 7% and 10% respectively. In contrast, a 100% increase
in real per capita GDP increases number of arrivals, receipts, and expenditure by 54%, 94%, 101%
respectively. Control variables such as human capital and gross capital formation as a percentage
of GDP play an important role in tourism and economic growth.
According to the literature, two are the main reasons that help us to explain why different
studies reach different conclusions. Both traits relate to how these studies treat the timing of causal
relationships between aid and growth. First, the most cited research has focused on measuring
the effect of aggregate aid on contemporaneous growth, while many aid-funded projects can take a
long time to influence growth. Funding for a new road for example might affect economic activity
in short order, funding for a vaccination campaign might only affect growth decades later, and
humanitarian assistance may never affect growth. Second, because current growth is likely to
affect current aid, these studies require a strategy to disentangle correlation from causation. They
have tended to rely on instrumental variables, but the instruments that have been used are of
questionable validity and strength. When these issues are addressed, the divergence in empirical
findings is greatly reduced (Clemens et al. 2012). In order to evaluate the result of the funds, it is
important to have in mind that the main aim of the cohesion policy is to improve the long-term
growth of the supported areas. No less than one-third of the EU budget is spent on a wide range
of programs that primarily aim to develop infrastructure, industries or modernize education. The
EU not only distributes the funds, but also is directly involved in how the funds should be spent.
The data show that cohesion policy fulfils a necessary condition for its effectiveness: poor regions
tend to receive more support than rich regions: nevertheless, each member state, however, affluent,
succeeds in drawing at least some funds to its regions (Ederveen et al. 2003).
3 Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We consider a rather reliable panel dataset stemming from two different sources. The first one is
from the Eurostat website and contains the main European Funds, including the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Stability Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Fund
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(EAF) and the European Cohesion Fund (ECF). This dataset pertains to European support and
does not involve any national financing. As Cerqua and Pellegrini (2018), describe in their study,
national co-financing tends to be proportionate to EU funding and therefore may not substantially
change the relative amount of funding distributed to different regions. The second source of our
data is the official website of the Greek Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), a national independent
organization of Greece, which is responsible–among other operations–for the construction and the
provision of various economic statistical reports. Due to this responsibility of ELSTAT we use from
its reports the following economic variables, the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross Fixed
Capital Formation (GFCF), Tourist Arrivals (TAR), Tourist Establishments (TE), Disposable
Income (DIN) and Employment (EMP). All the above time series contains annual observations
which span the period from 2000 to the end of 2017, that is before, during and after the financial
crisis which effected Greece. Our panel dataset is linked with thirteen major prefectures in Greece,
Attica, North and South Aegean, Crete, East Macedonia and Thrace, Central Macedonia, West
Macedonia, Epirus, Thessalia, Ionian Islands, West Greece, Continental Greece and finally the
Peloponnese.
All our variables enter in the analysis as annual growth rates of GDP, GCFC, TAR, TE, DIN
and EMP. We name these transformation by using the letter G at the end of each variable’s name,
(i.e., GDPG for real Gross Domestic Product growth). Since we seek to investigate the casual effect
of Structural Funds on the country’s development overall, we use as our core dependent variables
the annual growth of real GDP and then the other variables as dependent as well and in turn. The
explanatory variables are the main structural funds as they are mentioned above with their lags
and the lags of dependent variables and the other control variables as they appear in our equations
– the maximum number of lags is set to be up to 4. The variable nomenclature is given in Table 1
and 2, while descriptive statistics are given in Table 3; for some of the variables we also present the
boxplots for each of the prefectures we consider in this study. From the descriptive statistics (which
are computed over all observations) we can easily see that there exists considerable variation in
the data and that there is also considerable heterogeneity on the variables that have larger/smaller
variation. For example, we note that (looking at the coefficient of variation) the largest comes
from the European Regional Development Fund, and the second largest from the Cohesion Fund;
from the economic variables the largest variation is (not unsurprisingly) in disposable income and
the second largest is in employment growth – both the latter results are reflective of the differential
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impact that the financial crisis had on Greek households. We can also note that there appears
a drastically larger impact across prefectures on gross fixed capital formation than on real GDP
growth - although their medians are estimated to be very close. On the tourism side, we see similar
characteristics on arrivals and establishments in terms of variation but (again not unsurprisingly)
a higher mean and median in arrivals that establishments – in fact the mean and median of tourist
arrivals is about 3 times larger than that of establishments. It is interesting to note that the
highest cross-sectional variation in our boxplots can be seen in the tourist establishments and not
so much in tourist arrivals (compare Figure 3 with Figure 4).
3.2 Empirical Methodology
Our empirical methodology is dictated by the nature of our data: relatively short number of years
but with a constant number of cross-sections (prefectures), the latter being ideal in theory to
consider lagged structures in our panel that can be estimated with fixed effects.1
Our methodology has two parts. The first part, on the suggestion of one of the referees,
examines the differential impact of the fund variables into the main variable of interest, that is
real GDP growth, controlling for investment (gross fixed capital formation) and employment and
having only the lag of the dependent variable as a lag. These models were deemed necessary
for (a) testing the presence and need of fixed effects, (b) assessing the convergence based on the
autoregressive coefficient of the models and (c) examining which of the fund variables has a larger
impact on economic growth. The model estimated is thus:
yit = αi + ρyi,t−1 + z
>
itγ + fitδ + uit (1)
where the parameter vector γ contains the estimates for the gross fixed capital formation and
employment growth and the scalar parameter δ measures the impact of the corresponding fund
variable that enters into the model. This model is estimated by fixed effects and tested for the
null hypothesis of no fixed effects – we further discuss the specification in the results section that
follows.
In the second part of our methodology, we follow a consistent model reduction approach using
1The fixed nature of the prefectures on an expanding time frame gives us, in principle, complete freedom on
using just fixed effects and dynamic models. We performed all sorts of estimations for robustness including, as
described in the text, random effects and instrumental variables.
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three estimation methods (fixed effects, random effects and weighted least squares) and then
perform on the resulting models some robustness checks with panel GMM for the case where
economic variables are used on the right hand side and we should address problems of endogeneity.
Admittedly we could have performed our model reduction with a GMM approach but as we will see
the results do not change qualitatively. We note that the methodology we followed below provided
a total of more than 350 estimated models before achieving our final results – and we stress that
since our approach was general to specific we have completely avoided problems of data mining
and stepwise regression.
The general structure of our primary unrestricted model is given by an autoregressive dis-
tributed lag model where the initial group of the explanatory variables differ. That is, letting yit
denote the respective dependent variable and let zit denote the set of all explanatory variables,
a vector of dimension K. Let x
M(K)
it be a subset of the variables in zit, a vector of dimension
M(K) < K, that is obtained by considering a different starting set of fund variables to enter the
model plus the relevant control variables, i.e. other economic variables that we put on the right
hand size and their lags - the maximum number of lags is restricted to 4 years. Finally, let M
denote the number of combinations of fund and control variables that can be obtained by the
choice of the xit vector. Then, we write the representative model standard form as in:
yit = αi + x
M(K),>
it β
M(K) + uit (2)
which is then estimated by one of the three methods noted above. Once the initial model is
estimated we perform sequential model reduction of the variables in the model, removing the
insignificant ones one-at-a-time, starting with the highest p-value and continuing until all estimates
are significant at or below the 5% level of significance. To ensure against the well known drawback
of having highly correlated variables (which may impact on the order of variable elimination), but
still preserving the top-down approach we use, we perform an additional step where in every three
variables2 eliminated we perform a joint F -test for their significance; if the test accepts the null
hypothesis that they are jointly insignificant (at the 5% level) then we proceed to the next step, if
the test rejects the null hypothesis then we leave the variables in place and continue - this extra
step proved, however, unnecessary as we had no incidence of an F test rejecting the corresponding
2We select three variables in an attempt to balance size and power of the test under the premise that we would
not want to perform another test on many potentially correlated variables.
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null hypothesis.
We repeat the same procedure ab initio for each estimation procedure we use, thus ensuring that
the remaining variables are not a by-product of the estimation method. Finally, as an additional
robustness check, all models that remain after model reduction are re-estimated via panel GMM
– our results were qualitatively either identical or very similar and available on request.
4 Discussion of Results
4.1 Estimation results
We start our discussion with the results on the impact of the several structural funds on real GDP
growth GDPG. The results of our model reduction approach for this variable appear in Tables 4
through 7. Our discussion will of necessity focus on the various fund variables and their impact and
not on their statistical significance – because of our methodology we are left only with significant
variables in the tables of our results.
We start our discussion with the results on Table 4, the baseline models of equation (1). Here
the interest lies in the quality and magnitude of the various estimates. First, we alert the reader
that while all our models were estimated by fixed effects in none of them did we find the need for
them; the corresponding F -test for a common constant term accepted the null hypothesis for using
pooled least squares instead of fixed effects. On this first set of results we kept the estimation by
fixed effects in this table but also in all subsequent tables. Thus, the presence of a single constant
term might be a first indication of potential convergence. Turning next to the estimates of the
autoregressive parameter ρ of equation (1) we see that is highly statistically significant and almost
everywhere negative and around -0.20 – the exception being the model using the 3-year moving
sum of the cohesion fund variable, which has the highest autoregressive estimate which is positive.
Be that as it may, the autoregressive estimates show a range of half lives between 0.4 and 0.5,
values that are small enough to clearly suggest a convergent path for regional growth. Thus, the
autoregressive estimation results coupled with the presence of a single constant term do suggest
that, conditional on the models we are using, the fund variables are important in the convergence
of regional growth. Next, we notice two significant results from the rest of our estimates. First,
the predominant impact in these models is that of employment and not of investment; not only
are the estimates of employment growth significant while those of gross fixed capital formation
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are not, they are also many times larger in magnitude. This is not a surprising result given that
Greece was never free from mild to high unemployment. Second, all structural fund variables
when entering individually, or as a sum, are significant with only the ESF variable not being
significant; furthermore, we note that the highest magnitude of these variables goes to the EAF
variable, the one that pertains to agriculture. The collective impact on regional real growth of the
fund variables is clearly positive and significant but there is one lingering policy question, based
on our results: what if structural funds directly supported employment instead of going for this
in a round-about way? We further discuss the findings of this table at the policy implications
section that follows. To summarize, from Table 4 we can assess that structural fund variables had
a positive, and statistically, significant impact on regional growth which appears (on the models
examined) here to be compatible with a convergence argument.
We now turn to the discussion of our results on the model reduction approach in equation (2).
These models present a more detailed analysis on the impact of the structural fund variables. In
Table 5, we present some of the models for real GDP growth. Two key points are immediately
visible, independently of the estimation method: First, there is a consistent negative impact of the
European Stability Fund (ESFG), a consistent positive impact of the European Agricultural Fund
(EAFG), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDG) and the Employment (EMPG) on
economic growth respectively. Second, we note that the contemporaneous impact of the ESFG
and the EAFG are approximately the same but with opposite signs, while the dynamic terms of
the ESFG are both negative and of about the same magnitude, in all columns. Furthermore, the
dynamic terms of the EAFG and the ERDG are positive and have about the same magnitude also.
It is important to note that the models with the structural fund variables estimated by fixed effects
or by random effects produce the lowest AIC values among all models in Table 5 and this is critical
indicative of their explanatory power. The negative impact of structural funds on economic growth
may be explained by three potential admissions. First, support is available to members states when
there is co-financing by national tax revenues; in a case where taxation is highly distortionary, the
net growth effect may well be negative (Ederveen et al., 2006). Second, structural funds ensure
investment priorities including environmental development (EU 1300/2013); from this perspective
these projects can absorb funds for less attractive activities that could otherwise augment domestic
economic growth. Third, because structural payments are not solely based on clear criteria and
there is room for political bargaining (Mohl and Hagen, 2010), the central management could
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potentially include counterproductive actions.
Turning on Table 6 we observe that the models containing the impact of the aggregate of the
structural fund payments (TOPG) is positive both in contemporaneous and dynamic terms – and
therefore on its long-term impact. This result meets the expectation that structural change refers
to long-term shifts in the sectors of an economy (Teixeiraa and Queirs, 2016). Furthermore, we
note that for these models the significant control variables tally well with economic theory as what
enters is the change in employment with a positive sign as well. What is surprising in this table
is the negative impact of the tourist arrivals variable (TARG) with all terms contemporaneous
and dynamic being negative. In addition it is worth to note that the models with TARG as the
independent variable have the lowest value of the AIC, even lower than the previous ones in Table
5. Thus this result offers additional validity on the significant positive impact of explaining real
GDP growth via the payments of the structural funds.
In Table 7 we present some additional models with weighted least squares as our estimation
method. This is both to improve the robustness of our results and to account for the possibility
of differential uncertainty across the cross-sections of our data. We can immediately distinguish
that the same signs and approximate magnitudes are obtained for the fund variables –where they
appear–as in the previous tables. Especially, in Table 7 the signs for the contemporaneous term
of ESFG are again negative, but they are turning positive for the dynamic terms. Once more the
TARG is negative in all terms and in every estimated model. In this table we have the lowest
values for the AIC in contrast with the former tables.3
In Table 8 we have the results on the impact of the structural fund payments on investment,
where the gross fixed capital formation GFCFG is our dependent variable. We note that for
the ESFG explanatory variable there is a negative impact for the contemporaneous term and is
approximately 70 times larger than the case when real GPDG was our dependent variable (Tables 5
and 7). All the remaining variables have positive signs, both in contemporaneous and in its dynamic
terms. We also note that most of the results are concentrated in models that are estimated by
weighted least squares.
In Table 9 we illustrate the results of the impact of several structural funds on tourist arrivals
TARG. We observe that the ESFG variable – in its contemporaneous term – has a negative impact
3The AIC values here are based on the weighted data and are thus not directly comparable with Tables 5 and 6
but we can still see that the lowest values are again for the models that involve the presence of the structural fund
variables.
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on the dependent variable, irrespective of the estimation method we use. This result is consistent
with the signs that ESFG variable has in all previous tables. The rest of the variables have
positive signs with the exception of the dynamic term of the dependent variable TARG and the
contemporaneous term of TOPG, in most methods, suggestive that we have mixed signs.
Continuing with the next two tables 10 and 11 we have the results of the impact of the structural
funds on tourist establishments TEG. In Table 10 we can see that there are mixed signs from the
explanatory variables one more time, i.e. there is no consistent positive or negative impact of the
structural fund variables on this dependent variable; for example, ESFG has mixed signs through
the three different estimation methods. ERDG and TOPG have negative signs in their dynamic
terms and all remaining variables have positive signs. In Table 11 we have a similar structure as in
Table 10, as we see that ESFG has mixed signs in the contemporaneous term and a positive sign
in the dynamic term, EAFG has a positive sign in the contemporaneous term and negative in the
dynamic term while ERDG has a consistent positive impact on TEG and CFG has a consistent
positive impact. Finally, in Table 11 we see that the TOPG and EMPG have mixed signs in their
contemporaneous (positive) and dynamic (negative) terms.
Our last table, Table 12, has the results on the impact of the structural fund variables on
disposable income DING. Here all the explanatory variables have a consistent positive impact on
the dependent variable with the only exception of the ESFG fund which has a negative impact in
its contemporaneous and in its first lagged values. We note that this is the second most positively
impacted dependent variable after real GDP growth GDPG and this plays a role in our discussion
that follows.
4.2 Policy Implications
In this section we attempt to provide a policy-oriented summary of our results. This is important
as there has been considerable discussion about the prospective paths that the Greek economy
should take after the 2008 crisis and given the huge debt burden that the Greek economy has.
To begin with, we have ample suggestive evidence that, after the exhaustive model reduction
approach that has accounted for all possible starting points and combinations of the structural
fund variables, there are two main results: (a) the impact of the structural payments is indeed
positive for real GDP growth, gross fixed capital formation and disposable income (b) the impact
of structural payments in tourist arrivals and tourist establishments is mixed and not all around
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conclusive (c) the impact of other control variables sometimes tallies with economic theory (e.g.
higher employment growth is positively related to real GDP growth) and sometimes does not (e.g.
higher tourist arrivals growth is negatively associated with real GDP growth, after taking into
account the presence of all other variables). Given the past status of the Greek economy, the one
that was in place when the crisis hit, one might venture to say that these results indicate that
the positive effect on real GDP growth and disposable income is a demand-side effect: structural
fund payments were directed into consumption (or over-consumption) with little absorption on
the supply side, the generation of infrastructure or considerably higher productive investment.
Furthermore, the over-reliance (and over-promoting) on tourism cannot be justified in terms of
the impact of structural fund payments: one the one hand we know that tourism in Greece is a
major industry with little need for advertisement and in good years tourism revenues flow easily,
be there is infrastructure or not in the rest of the economy - thus, minimal spending on fixed-cost
investment is required and one can safely assume that structural payments were converted into
consumption more than they would have been if there was an active need to support the tourist
industry. This is reflected on the consistently mixed signs that we obtain for the models on tourist
arrivals and tourist establishments (and especially the latter variable).
Our results are well connected with the literature and also with the most recent state of affairs
in the Greek economy. Beginning with the null hypothesis, that EU membership has zero impact
on economic growth, Andersen et al. 2019 in their research, although unable to reject it, reach the
conclusion that membership does not appear to increase prosperity.Moreover, Campos et al. 2014,
in their research support that per capita GDP increases with the EU membership in most of the
countries of their study, while their evidence shows that only one country - Greece after the EU
accession experienced lower per capita GDP,thus the gap between Greek and the EU average GDP
has increased. As the literature suggests both fixed investment and tourism are conductors to
growth but the question here is more subtle: how to use the structural fund payments to improve
conditions for investment and growth - and what we suggest that we find is that while the impact
on fixed capital formation and disposable income is positive the impact on tourism variables is
mixed, and so is the total effect on the Greek economy. We can judge this by the results of the
crisis, where the over-consumption was presented as one of the major structural problems of the
Greek economy and, naturally, structural fund payments did help to fuel over-consumption. This
over-consumption was a sledgehammer when the crisis hit: not only investment fall around -15%
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but the gross domestic savings ratio was much lower than that of the EU, at around 10%, that
there were not enough domestic resources to re-finance investment (Soukiazis et al., 2018).
The past problems of the Greek economy cannot be alleviated by further structural fund pay-
ments, for the country both has a tremendous debt and tax rates and unemployment that are
inordinately high (Monokroussos et al., 2017) and (Anastasatos et al., 2018), if these payments
are not directed to productive investment and not income or consumption support. Gunzinger
and Sturm 2016, in their research, based on a simple OLS framework, suggest that on average
governments without political constraints have implemented stimulus packages that were about 1
to 2.7 percentage points of GDP larger in size than packages enacted by governments that faced
political constraints and thus did have to cooperate with the opposition. The problem lies not with
the payments but in their use. As income and productivity still remain sluggish, over-taxation
and under-investment are still characteristics of the economy we will have that GDP continues to
rely on excessively on private consumption (ca 68% of GDP, Karamouzis and Anastasatos, 2019)
- this cannot continue for ever.
5 Conclusion
The EU has disbursed enormous amounts of structural fund payments to all the countries in
the union with, essentially, the same single aim for all of them: promoting long-run economic
growth. The recipe is always simple and is the same, use the funds for productive investments,
infrastructure and for the sectors that your country has a comparative advantage. Use them for
consumption or income support and you jeopardize your long-term growth prospects.
The case of Greece has sparked interest mostly for the public finance problems and the sovereign
debt crisis that it faced (still does). On attempting to address these problems post-crisis, a number
of other issues came afloat such as the productive structure of the Greek economy, the inefficiencies
of the public sector, tax evasion and many others. In this paper we examined the impact of EU
structural fund payments on a number of economic variables and our results are aligned both with
the literature and these problems just mentioned. EU structural funds are an important policy
tool, but a tool is as good as the hand the uses it – that is, domestic economic policy. With the
productive structure and the political infrastructure that the Greek economy had in place it would
have been a very difficult proposition for the EU fund payments not to contribute to consumption
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and income support (and thus to the demand side of GDP). We did find that fund payments had a
positive impact on real GDP and disposable income and less so on investment but also found that
the impact on tourism variables was mixed – the crisis revealed the structural failures of the Greek
economy and thus we have to re-think about the usage of EU fund payments, the debt repayments
not withstanding.
It appears that a more coherent, well-designed and monitored program of EU funds disburse-
ment is required so that future payments reach their ultimate goal, the regeneration of productive
investment in Greece, so that the country can be put back in the path of long-term economic
growth.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD CV
DING 0.65 0.85 −10.40 10.30 6.78 10.36
EAFG 19.72 6.33 −41.78 88.36 49.43 2.51
EMPG −0.26 −0.03 −4.60 3.48 2.49 9.48
ERDG 0.92 1.58 −46.10 48.77 36.31 39.47
ESFG 11.17 21.76 −37.41 49.56 33.02 2.96
GDPG 0.94 1.02 −7.54 9.30 5.66 6.03
GFCFG 83.25 1.34 −88.4 727.48 248.48 2.98
TARG 2.92 1.41 −8.29 18.14 8.03 2.75
TCFG 2.84 −13.46 −58.25 78.22 54.10 19.04
TEG 0.82 0.37 −1.42 4.18 1.66 2.03
TOPG −3.71 0.04 −51.92 40.37 34.50 9.29
24
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming (13) 2021
www.RofEA.org
Table 4: Impact of Structural Funds on Gross Domestic Product - Control Models
Dependent variable: GDPG
Estimation Method FE FE FE RE RE FE FE FE
const 0.880 1.570*** 1.549*** 0.479 1.391*** 1.501*** 1.429*** 1.341**
GDPG 1 0.043 -0.168*** -0.185*** 0.237*** -0.181*** -0.178*** -0.172*** -0.212***
GFCFG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000







n 195 195 195 179 194 195 195 182
` −670.1 −635 −632.3 −508.3 −629.6 −632.2 −633.7 −588.5
1. FE refers to estimation by fixed effects.
2. All variables are expressed in growth rates and GDPG 1 is the first lag of the dependent variable.
3. TOPG is the sum of all payments and TFCG is the 3-year moving sum of the cohesion fund variable.
4. (a) and (b) indicate that original estimates are multiplied by 100.
5. n is the number of usable observations and ` is the maximum likelihood criterion.
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Table 5: Impact of Structural Funds on Gross Domestic Product, Part #1
Dependent variable: GDPG
Estimation Method FE FE RE RE FE
const 0.945 -1.679** 0.943* -1.854** 1.801**
ESFG -0.048** -0.044** -0.049** -0.053**
EAFG 0.040** 0.048** 0.041** 0.044**
ESFG 1 -0.015* -0.021**
ESFG 2 -0.016* -0.016*
EAFG 1 0.038** 0.030**





n 182 156 182 156 208
AIC 1263.547 910.961 1245.089 884.039 1493.789
1. FE and RE refer to fixed effects and random effects respectively.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 6: Impact of Structural Funds on Gross Domestic Product, Part #2
Dependent variable: GDPG
Estimation Method FE RE FE FE RE
const 1.746** 1.205** 1.609** 1.637** 1.545**
EMPG 1.296** 0.998**
EMPG 1 0.770** 0.534**
GFCFG 1 0.001** 0.000**
GDPG 1 -0.271** 0.225** 0.227**
EMPG 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
TARG -0.039** -0.033*
TARG 1 -0.042** -0.036**
TARG 2 -0.056** -0.052**
TOPG 0.023** 0.025**
TOPG 2 0.018** 0.018**
n 195 195 208 131 131
AIC 1266.901 1274.489 1514.35 771.71 759.173
1. FE and RE refer to fixed effects and random effects respectively.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 7: Impact of Structural Funds on Gross Domestic Product, Part #3
Dependent variable: GDPG
Estimation Method WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS
const 0.630 -1.660** -0.557** 1.518** 1.760** 1.262** 0.309
ESFG -0.052** -0.031** -0.066**










TARG 2 -0.216** -0.056**




n 182 169 52 208 131 207 182
AIC 521.705 493.243 41.516 593.9999 387.942 590.723 524.792
1. WLS refers to weighted least squares with groupwise heteroscedasticity.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 8: Impact of Structural Funds on Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Dependent variable: GFCFG
Estimation Method FE RE RE FE FE FE WLS WLS














CFG 2 0.067** 0.065** 0.058* 0.067** 0.004***
n 181 195 181 181 181 182 194 153
AIC 3101.477 3379.696 3088.829 3099.767 3101.477 3132.873 2875.134 1683.476
1. FE, RE and WLS refer to fixed effects, random effects and weighted least squares respectively.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 9: Impact of Structural Funds on Tourist Arrivals
Dependent variable: TARG
Estimation Method FE FE FE RE RE RE







TARG 1 -0.173** 0.234*** -0.182**
TOPG -0.053* 0.078** -0.054* -0.078**
n 153 176 141 140 176 141
AIC 1379.241 1572.048 1277.323 1257.079 1555.732 1260.190
1. FE and RE refer to fixed effects and random effects respectively.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 10: Impact of Structural Funds on Tourist Establishments, Part I #1
Dependent variable: TEG
Estimation Method FE FE RE RE RE RE
const 5.264** 1.084** 1.075** 1.280** 1.345** 1.285**






n 52 52 52 52 52 65
AIC 1470.761 1163.686 220.6031 209.004 220.174 386.644
1. FE and RE refer to fixed effects and random effects respectively.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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FE WLS WLS WLS WLS
















n 52 26 52 65
AIC 1470.761 143.582 83.90421 143.090 177.4086
1. FE and WLS refer to fixed effects and weighted least squares respectively.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 12: Impact of Structural Funds on Disposable Income
Dependent variable: DING
Estimation Method FE RE RE FE WLS WLS WLS WLS
const -0.342 1.273* -1.265 1.372** 1.010* -2.795** 1.323** -0.043
ESFG -0.031* -0.052** -0.054**
EAFG 0.018* 0.022**
ESFG 1 -0.045** -0.029* -0.022*
ESFG 2 0.032**
EAFG 1 0.021** 0.027**









CFG 1 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0003**
CFG 2 0.0002**
DING 1 0.257** 0.286** 0.424** 0.269**
n 181 182 181 208 182 166 208 182
AIC 1305.685 1325.376 1275.715 1472.375 1290.124 1097.131 1390.202 1163.686
1. FE, RE and WLS refer to fixed effects, random effects and weighted least squares respectively.
2. the notation XXX i denotes the ith lag of the associated variable.
3. n is the number of usable observations and AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Figure 1: Boxplots of real GDP growth per prefecture
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Figure 2: Boxplots of total structural fund payments gowth per prefecture
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Figure 3: Boxplots of tourist establishments growth per prefecture
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Figure 4: Boxplots of tourist arrivals growth per prefecture
37
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming (13) 2021
www.RofEA.org
Figure 5: Boxplots of disposable income growth per prefecture
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